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TRUSTS AT HOME AND ABROAD
As a result of the World Trade Centre terrorism of 11 September 
2001, attention is being focused upon charitable trusts that may 
have been operating as a front for terrorist organisations. This could 
so easily have been the case in many offshore jurisdictions where the 
Attorney-General's responsibility for charitable trusts is very 
nominal and largely ignored, especially when there is no 
requirement of registration of charities, tax exemption for them not 
being a consideration in a tax-haven.
No doubt, pressure will be brought (via the USA, UK and the 
Financial Action Task Force) against these jurisdictions to take steps 
(perhaps by creating a statutory Charity Commission) to ascertain 
the existence of charitable trusts and to check that their funds have 
been genuinely used for charitable purposes. If funds have not been 
so used, then the trustees will need to be replaced and to restore the 
money discovered to have been lost (upon falsification of the 
accounts), except to the extent the trust was a sham trust run to the 
orders of the settlor whose directions had simply been obeyed by 
the trustees who (or whose officers) will need to be aware of 
potential criminal charges and of extradition treaties.
At home, there have been two interesting developments. In 
elucidating beneficiaries' private law rights to complain of decisions 
made by trustees acting arbitrarily, irrationally or perversely to any 
sensible expectation of the settlor, recourse is being had to the public 
law terminology of legitimate expectations (of beneficiaries) and of 
trustees acting with Wednesbury Corporation unreasonableness in 
reaching a decision that no reasonable body of persons properly 
directing themselves could have reached. Such recourse is
o
unnecessary and must not be allowed to mislead some judge into 
considering that the views of beneficiaries entitled in default of an 
appointment must be heard before exercise of a discretionary 
power of appointment: the trustees can be in a position properly to 
exercise their discretion without seeking written or oral 
representations from affected persons.
The idea that trustees must be properly informed, so that their 
actions can be set aside if they ignored a relevant factor or took 
account of an irrelevant factor, has increased the burdens of 
trustees. Indeed, in the pensions fund context, where beneficiaries 
have earned their interests as deferred pay, a beneficiary need only 
prove that the trustees might have acted differently but for ignoring 
a relevant factor: AMP(UK) Ltd v Barker (2001) 3 ITELR 414. In the 
private family trust context it seems likely dial a beneficiary has to 
prove that the trustees would have acted differently.
It is, however, open to the trustees to claim they would have acted 
differently but for overlooking very relevant tax rules creating an 
unappreciated significant tax liability, so that the court has declared 
their actions void: Green v Cobham [2000] WTLR 1101, Abacus Trust 
v NSPCC [2001] WTLR 953, (2001) 3 ITELR 846. It seems too 
good to be true to permit one class of taxpayer to undo what has 
been done while other classes of taxpayers cannot achieve such 
magical results. The Revenue was not a party to these two cases: it 
may well argue that the court should hold the trustees' decision to 
be voidable so that a valid tax liability can arise before the decision 
was avoided. After all, the trustees had capacity to do what they 
decided to do even though it was in breach of their duties. Some 
further fascinating litigation is in prospect.
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